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Efficiencywage models of the effort elicitation type have important implications for labor
market dynamics. These models have a wide array of discontinuoussunspot equilibria driven
by extraneous variables, in addition to well-behaved equilibria characterized by continuous, slowly-
adjusting patterns of employment. Many aspects of actual labor markets can be replicated by these
models. For example, the longer-run movements they predict in employment allowmacroeconomic
evidence for alargelabor supply elasticity to be reconciled with panel data evidence for a small
laborsupplyelasticity. Many testable, but as yet untested predictions about labor market dynamics




Ann Arbor, MI 48109I. Introduction
Encouraged by a belief in genuinely involuntary unemployment, many economists have turned
in recent years to "efficiency wage" theories as descriptions of the labor market. Despite serious
criticisms, these theories—emphasizing the positive incentive effects of high wages that may induce
firms to set non-market-clearing wages—remain some of the more promising ways of modelling
labor markets beset by unemployment and underemployment.
One of the main variants on the theme of efficiency wages is the effort elicitation model,' set
out in its canonical form by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Many authors have used a version of this
model to examine various issues.2 One of the important limitations on the use of this model has
been the lack of an adequate analysis of its dynamics outside of the steady state.3 The objective of
this paper is to provide such an analysis of the dynamics of this type of efficiency wage model and
to address some of the key questions about an efficiency-wage labor market that depend on such
an analysis.
The first important question is: how, in theory, should an efficiency-wage labor market react to
shocks? Is there a propagation mechanism for shocks peculiar to the effort elicitation model? This
question is motivated by the literature on real business cycles. Second, what is the relationship
between the macroeconomic labor supply elasticity implied by an effort elicitation model and that
implied by the corresponding competitive model of the labor market? This question is important
both for Real Business Cycle theory and for the Neo-Keynesian theory of price rigidity. Finally,
the efficiency wage literature itself has raised the question of how one should test efficiency wage
models empirically. In this context, the question is whether the dynamic properties of the effort
elicitation model provide any way of empirically testing for that model.
Real business cycle theorists have been at pains to discover the reasons for the persistence of
business cycle movements; in particular, they have raised the question of how the serial correlation
properties of shocks should be related to the serial correlation properties of the business cycle move-
ments they cause. Production, delivery and construction lags, as well as input-output relationships
SeeKatz (1986),who calls thisvariant"The Shirking Model."
2Seethe referencesinKatz (1986).
Some authors, such as Bulow and Summers(1986), havemade guesses about the nature of the dynamic
equilibria of these models, but did not completely realize the subtlety of the problem, which—as will be seen
below—involves multip dynamic equilibria.
Iamong various industries, are cited as mechanisms by which business cycle movements can be more
persistent than the shocks that cause them.4 But the workings of the labor market seem just as
natural a place to look for a propagation mechanism that might help explain cyclical persistence.
In particular, one might think that lags in the adjustment of employment levels to current demand
conditions might contribute to the persistence of business cycle movements. This is. in fact, one of
the predictions of the canonical effort elicitation model, as will be shown below.
Real business cycle theorists have also made great efforts to explain the high labor supply
elasticities that seem to be evidenced in macro-data in the face of strong evidence for relatively
low microeconomic labor supply elasticities.5 Indeed, Prescott's (1986) title "Theory Ahead of
Business Cycle Measurement," seems to reflect at least in part his exultation over the fact that real
business cycle theory has finally been able to predict higher macroeconomic labor supply elasticities
than those indicated by macroeconomic data. A divergence between the microeconomic elasticity of
labor supply and the macroeconomic elasticity of labor supply requires some kind of variation in the
number of workers working. Real Business Cycle Models essentially rely on variation in labor-force
participation to explain why the macroeconomic labor supply elasticity exceeds the microeconomic
labor supply elasticity. By contrast, efficiency wage models focus primarily on variation in the
involuntary unemployment rate to explain why the macroeconomic labor supply elasticity exceeds
the m.icroeconomic labor supply elasticity.
The hope of using efficiency wage models to explain the coexistence of apparently large aggre-
gate labor supply elasticities and the small individual labor supply elasticities found when using
panel data lends extra importance to an understanding of the lagged response of employment to
demand conditions mentioned above. Because of this lagged response of employment, the macroe-
conomic labor supply elasticity in the very short run is the same as the labor supply elasticity for
an individual. However, within a few quarters (according to what seems a reasonable calibration),
See for example Long and Ploeser (1983)and Kydland and Prescott (1982).
Large macroeconomic labor supply elasticities are not only necessary in order to explain the data about busine
cycle movements, they are also a key element in the Neo-Keynesian theory of nominal price rigidity. Ball and
Romer (1987) show that a large macroeconomic labor supply elasticity greatly reduces the pressure on firms to
adjust their nominal prices in response to changes in demand, making it much more plaubIe that small costs
of changing a nominal price could lead large monetary non.neutralities. While the model below has no costs
of changing a nominal price and therefore exhibits monetary neutrality, it represents a situation ripe for small
nominal rigidities of that type to have important effects. Adding small costs of changing prices to the model
below is an important topic for future research.
2employment levels will adjust, leading to a larger medium and long-run labor supply elasticity.
Thus, effort elicitation models can help explain large aggregate labor supply elasticities at busi-
ness cycle frequencies, but could not explain higher labor supply elasticities if they were found at
frequencies much higher than that.
Any empirical test that can provide evidence for or against the effort elicitation model is
potentially valuable because this model has many striking and important implications for industrial
policy, trade policy, and the desirability of unemployment insurance and of affirmative action
not shared by competing theories.6 The results presented below indicate that in a labor market
described by the effort elicitation model we should find (a) that the overali rate of hiring in the labor
market affects individual firms' labor costs, and (b) that aggregate employment is a distributed
lag of demand conditions, with the length of the lag structure varying with the parameters of the
model in a way that can be precisely specified.
The remainder of the paper will proceed as follows. Section II discusses the dynamics of the
basic Shapiro-Stiglitz model, assuming that employment follows a continuous path over time. Sec-
tion III shows that other dynamic equilibria exist, in which employment follows a discontinuous
path; however, it is argued that these discontinuous equilibria are of interest primarily as a theo-
retical curiosity, and should be left to one side when discussing the empirical applications of the
model. Section IV modifies the basic Shapiro-Stiglitz model by allowing for movements in hours
per worker per week7 as well as in employment, with the object of calculating a rough but realistic
estimate of the lag length and the short- and long-run macroeconomic labor supply elasticities.
Section V reinterprets the model as a story about involuntary underemployment in the secondary
sector of a dual labor market rather than as a story about involuntary unemployment and makes an
estimate of the lag length and the short- and long-run labor supply elasticities given that interpre-
tation. It is found that the model is much more helpful in explaining cyclical persistence and high
macroeconomic labor supply elasticities under this interpretation. Section VI is the Conclusion.
II. The Dynamics of the Shapiro-Stiglitz Model
See, (or example,thepolicy implications mentioned in Shapin, and Stiglitz (1984) and in Bulow and Summers
(1986).
If fixed coets per day of work are important, most of the movement in hours per worker per week should come
from movements in the average number of days worked per week.
3In this section we will use exactly the model described by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), where
a detailed description of the model can be found.8 In examining out-of-steady state dynamics, we
will begin by looking for dynamic equilibria in which employment follows a continuous path (but
in which wages may jump), deferring to Section III a discussion of dynamic equilibria involving
sudden jumps in employment. We will assume the existence of a representative firm, which is an
inessential simplification when looking at the steady state, but is an important restriction outside
the steady state.9
Shapiro and Stiglitz' fundamental asset equation for an employed shirker is their equation (1):
(1) rVj=w+(b+q)(V,,—Vj).
They describe this equation as "interest rate times asset value equals flow benefits (dividends) plus
expected capital gains (or losses)." The "asset value" V is expected discounted value of utility
for an employed shirker. The "flow benefit" is the wage w. The expected "capital gain" (actually
a loss) is the probability of job loss for a shirker b + q, where b is the exogenous separation rate
and q is the probability of being caught shirking, times the amount of utility lost by becoming
unemployed V,, —V.
Out of steady state, the only modification needed is to add the rate of change in V itself to
expected "capital gain." Thus, we have
(1') rVj() =w(t)+ (b + q)(V,(t) —V(t))+ l'(t).
Though it may not be obvious, writing the equation in terms of a rate of change implicitly assumes
that V(t) follows a continuous path, which, we will see, depends on employment following a
continuous path.1° A similar remark applies to the other equations in this section.
Shapiro and Stiglitz' fundamental asset equation for an employed nonshirker is
(2) rV=tv—ë+b(V,—V'),
The treatment in this sectionowes a greatdealtosuggestionsofDavtd Romer's.
The main problemthatwould arisein the absence of a representativefirm isthat somefirmsmight well be
laying off workers even while aggregate hiringispositive.
tOTechnically, we are assuming piecewise differentiability of VI(t) as well. However, with enough mathematical
machinery, this differentiability assumption can be relaxed. The key assumption is continuity.
4where Vi" is the expecteddiscountedvalue of utility for an employed nonshirker and ë is the
disutility of working instead of shirking. (The probability of job separation for a nonshirker is just
the exogenous separation rate b.) To allow for out-of-steady state dynamics, we need to include
the expected change in V as part of the capital gain term, yielding
(2') rV(t) =w(t) — e +b(V,(t) —V'(t))+
Theno-shirking condition is V Vi'. If a firm was considered absolutely trustworthy by
workers, it would be possible for a firm to put off or defer workers' wages in such a way that
V < V without adversely affecting the firm's profits. However, Shapiro and Stiglitz assume that
firms cannot be trusted, in order to rule out bonding schemes in which a worker pays an employment
fee to get a job and then is motivated by the fear of having to pay another employment fee toget
another job if he or she is fired. If firms are perceived as untrustworthy enough that such a bonding
scheme cannot work despite the great potential benefits of such an arrangement to both workers and
firm, it is clear that the perception of the firm as untrustworthy will make workers loath to accept
a situation in which the firm could gain by replacing workers to whom it had made an implicit but
not legally binding promise of higher wages later. Since by Shapiro and Stiglitz' assumption that
once working rather than shirking, a worker cannot work any harder, there is no gain to the firm in
having V" strictly greater than V to counterbalance even a small cost due to workers' distrust of
its motives, and therefore, a firm should keep the utility for a shirker and for a nonshirker exactly
equal at all times:
(3) V(t)=V(t)for all t.
Since this is true for all values of t, we also have
(4) V(t) =1''(t)for all t.
Subtracting (2') from (1'), and using (3) and (4) to simplify the result, yields
(5) V'(t) =V(t)+for all t,
I havetaken the libertyof addhig a bartoShapiro andStiglit'"e"inorder to distinguish it from the base for
naturallogarithms.
5which'2 in turn implies
(6) V() = for all t.
The expected discounted value of utility for an unemployed worker V, must obey the "asset"
equation:
(7) rV(t) = (t) + a(t)(V -V)+= (t) + a(t) +
whereth(t)represents theinstantaneousutility of an unemployed individual and a(t) is the job
acquisition rate.13 Substituting in from (5) and (6) to eliminate V,., and v',.yields:
(8) r(V -) =th(t) + a(t)! +
Together with (2') and (5), this implies
(9) w(t)= th(t)+ë+ (r+b+a(t)).
The job acquisition rate a(t) can be determined from the employment flow identity
(10) L(t)=a()(N(t) —L())
—bL(t),
where N(s) is the size of the labor force. Rearranging, we have
(11) a(s) —L(t) +bL(t) -
N(t)-L(t)
Therefore,
(12) w(t)t(t) + e+[r + _______
e
Thisis the dynamic version of Shapiro and Stiglitz' "No Shirking Condition," which in an effort
elicitation model takes the place of the labor supply curve in the standard model of the labor market.
12Equation(5) has the following interpretation. To keep a worker from shirkmg at any given instant, the benefit
per unit time from shirking, ,mustbe less than the coat per unit time, which is the probability of detection
tim the cost of job loss. Thus, < q(V —V,).The argument ruling out a strict inequality and insuring that
V = V = V is as above.
13Thereis no issue about what the expected discounted value of utility for a newly employed worker will be,
since in equilibrium, no one shirks, and V = V' in any case.
6Turning this dynamic "No Shirking Condition" around, the rate of increase in employment can be
viewedasa function of the current wage and the current level of employment:
(13) L(t)= [ (w(t)-- (fl) - r]{N(t) -L(t)I-bN(t).
On the demand side of the labor market, we can obtain a very simple dynamic demand relation
if we are willing the make the simplifying assumption that the representative firm always has a
positive gross hiring rate. Since labor market turnover is on the order of 30% per year,'4 this
assumption does not put any serious limitation on the size of shocks we can analyze.'5 Given this
assumption that gross hiring is always positive, the condition that the marginal product of labor
is equal to the wage must hold at every point in time, since if the marginal product of labor were
ever different from the wage, the firm could increase profits by delaying or accelerating the hiring of
workers hired around that tjme.16 Aggregating across the labor market as in Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984), we have:
(14) w(t) =p(t)F'(L())for all t,
where p(t) can be interpreted either as the price of the output of the firms sharing this labor market
relative to the price of wage—goods, or as an indicator of shifts in productivity.
Equations (13) and (14) allow us to diagram the response of the labor market to shifts in p(t),
N(t), the number of workers in the labor force, and (t), instantaneous utility when unemployed.
Figure 1 shows the effect of a permanent increase in the relative price of output or productivity p(t).
Figure 2 shows the effect of a permanent increase in N(t).Afallin L'(t) would have a qualitatively
similar effect. Figure 3 shows the effect of a temporary increase in p(t). There is nothing wrong with
having an anticipated sudden decline in the wage as depicted in Figure 3; the fact that employment
suddenly begins to decline after p(t) returns to its original value keeps workers motivated despite
the suddenly lower wage. 'SeeMedoff (1979). 'Theunattractive implication that layoffs do not occur should not be blamed on this assumption. It is much more
the result of the a.,sumption of a representative firm than it is of the assumption that aggregate employment
will not contract at a rate faster than the turnover rate.
1€Bydelaying or accelerating the hiring of workers, and making a slight adjustment for the resulting change in
the pattern of employee attrition, the firm can employ a little more labor at that instant without altering the
amount of labor it employs at other instants.Under the assumption of rational expectations, the results above can easily be extended to
handle macroeconomic uncertainty (in addition to the microeconomic uncertainty about how long
it would take for a worker to get caught shirking or to quit exogenously), while still ruling out
any cliscontinuities in the overall level of employment. To carry out the extension to the case of
macroeconomic uncertainty, 'j,Vandin (1'), (2'), (7) and (8) need to be replaced with their
expected values. But by the same arguments as those given for them above, (3)—(6) and (9)—(14)
should hold unaltered riot only at all dates but also in every state of nature.'7 Regardless of the
complexity of macroeconomic uncertainty, there will be a dynamic stochastic equilibrium in which
employment follows a Continuous path, since given any current level of employment, moving along
the shifting Marginal Productivity Condition at a velocity determined by the shifting "No Shirking
Condition" will satisfy both conditions.
Several key implications of the model are already apparent. First, as is clear from the figures.
(13) indicates a lagged response of employment to demand conditions. Intuitively, the reason for
this adjustment lag in employment is that in a boom, a firm is reluctant to hire workers when all
the other firms are also hiring, since the motivation of workers who see so many "help-wanted"
ads around them will be impaired unless they get extra-high wages. Thus, each firm tries to delay
hiring extra workers, which moderates the overall rate of hiring in the labor market. In a recession.
a firm is not so eager to reduce its labor force if it suddenly becomes easier to motivate its workers
due to reductions in employment and therefore dismal job prospects elsewhere. This fact tends to
moderate the aggregate rate of reduction in employment.'8
Second, a macroeconomic labor supply elasticity exceeding the microeconomic labor supply
elasticity is insured by the long run responses of employment to changes in demand, since so far we
have assumed a microeconomic labor supply elasticity of zero.'9 Third, it is clear that the overall
rate of hiring in the labor market affects individual firm's labor costs.2°
'Wemust, however, assume that each firm is hiring not only at all dates but also in all states of nature to insure
that(14) holds at alldatesinall states.
U thechangesin employmentcanoccurinstantly,as inthe next section, thisreasoningno longer holds, since
aspecific disturbance is over beforeithas a chance toaffectworker motivation ex post,although theprospect
ofsuch asuddenchangeinemployment doesaffectthe wage itexante, asshownbelow.
' Here we arereferringtothesupply ofhours,and notthesupply ofeffort,which isquite elastic.
The lag lengthsandelasticities impld bythis modelcould readily be calculated,but itisltterto wait and
calibrate the model afterwe have addedthe decision about weekly hours.
8Finally, one can see that after a permanent shock to labor demand the wage winitiallyover-
shoots the value it has in the new steady state, during the period when the hiring rate is especially
high. On its face, this result seems to call the effort elicitation model into question, since there is
little evidence that the wage overshoots in response to shocks. However, one could argue that w
representsimplicit labor costs first and wages only secondarily, and that labor costs may exhibit
this kind of overshooting pattern even if wages follow a gradual, monotonic adjustment path in
reponse to a shock. The difference in the response of labor Costs and the wage might result from
variation in non-pecuniary benefits (e.g. whether the boss remembers to bring the secretary a
birthday gift may depend on how many other job openings there are for secretaries right then) or
from the deferral of promised wage payments until the next regularly scheduled date for raises.
III. Dynamic Equilibria with Sudden Jumps in Employment
Though uncertainty by itself does not change the overall character of the equilibria, allowing
sudden jumps in employment—when joined with uncertainty about the timing of such jumps21—
drastically changes the character of the possible equilibria of the model. As a description of labor
markets in our world, the sudden, synchronized labor-market-wide jumps in employment necessary
for these discontinuous equilibria seem implauTsible. In practice, there are likely to be both serious
difficulties of synchronization across firms in both the timing and magnitude of a jump in hiring
that point to following a continuous path of employment as a "focal point" equilibrium, and
costs associated with the rate of hiring which may be insignificant at any normal rate of hiring, but
are important when considering the sudden hiring of many employees at once, tending to rule Out
the model's discontinuous equilibria.23 However, to those who believe that sudden, synchronized,
labor-market-wide jumps in employment are possible, the model we are using presents an interesting
21 We cannot analyze perfectly anticipated jumps in employment in the framework here since by (12) the cost of
having a worker at the instant of the anticipated jump would be infinite. As a result, the firm would want to
rid itself of workers immediaty before that instant and the assumption that the hiring rate is always positive
could not be maintained.
22 See Schelling (1960) for a discusthon of "focal points" in game theory. In conversation, Larry Summers has
argued for immediate adjustment to a new steady state as the "focal point" equilibrium. However, there ts
a clean solution of this form only when there is only a single, permanent shock. Given a shock of any other
shape, since there must be some adjustment after an initial jump of any size, the only size of initial jump that
stands out from the rest is no initial jump at all.
23 The notion of hiring costs that are infinitesimal at any finite rate of hiring, but prohibitive at an infinite rate
of hiring could be formalized (for example by making instantaneous profits equal to F(L) —wL—E(bL+ L)2
and by taking the limit of the solution as —0),and would have no effect on the model except to reduce the
set of equilibria to the single continuous equilibrium.
9array of "sunspot" equilibria driven by extraneous occurrences
A full study of all of the sunspot equilibria is beyond the scope of this paper,but it is instructive
to show how the equations are modified when sudden jumps in employment areallowed and to
present a specific example of a sunspot equilibrium.
Let A(t) be the instantaneous probability of a sudden jump in employment at time t. conditional
on all information available up to that time. Then together with themodification necessary to
incorporate any uncertainty, (1') becomes
(15)rVj(t) =w(t)+ (b + q)(V(i) —V(t))+ E 'j(t)+A(t)E [V(c) —
whereE is an expectation conditional on a jump, E? is an expectation conditional on no jump,
and, for simplicity, the assumption that the firm is always hiring and never has layoffs is still
maintained. Similarly, (2') becomes
(16) rV' =w—e+ b(V,. —Vi')+ E VE(t) + A(t)E' [V(t) —V(t.
It is still true that V and Vi" must be equal at every date and in every state ((3) and (4)), which
implies that their changes must be equal as well, even when a jump is involved, and since this
implies that (5) still holds, at every date and in every state, these changes are always equal to those
in
To allow for the possibility of jumps in employment, (7) must be modified to
(17)rV(t) =(t)+ a(t) + E (t) + A(t)E [v(t+) -V(F)+
where a(t) is now the job acquisition rate in the absence of discontinuities in the level of employment.
The counterpart to (8) is
(18) r(V(t) -) = (t)+ a(t)! + E t) + (t)E [V(t+) V(t) +
the counterpart to (9) is
(19) w(t) =tD(t) + e+
{r+ + a(t) + (t)E
andthe counterpart to (12) is
(20) w(t) =(i)+ e + [r +E?L(:)+bN(t)+ )Er
L(t-)J
10The only real change is the addition of the instantaneous probability of a jump, times the expected
fraction of unemployed workers who will be hired if there is a jump, times the gain from becoming
employed. In other words, in order to motivate workers, the firm has to pay according to the full
expected probability of being rehired, including the chance of being rehired during a sudden jump
in employment.
Given the assumption of positive hiring at every date and in every state, the equality of the
wage and a worker's marginal value product at every date and in every state should still hold.
Thus, the two equations that need to be satisfied are (20) and (14).
The following example will make clearer what such a sunspot equilibrium is like. Suppose that
(21) L(t) =(1
—b)et—bt+ k]1'
where tisthe length of time that has elapsed since the last jump in employment, k is a constant
between b and b —Iand e (without the bar) is the base of natural logarithms. Let
(22)
where ii', A and = areconstants. Then L(t) and w(t) satisfy (20), and equations
(21) and (22) implicitly define a labor demand curve, which in turn yields an aggregate production
function for which (14) is satisfied even when productivity or the relative price of output p is always
equal to 1.
In the next section, we will again concentrate on the dynamic equilibrium involving a contin-
uous path of employment, but it should be kept in mind that other equilibria involving jumps in
employment may be possible.
IV. Adding the Hours Decision
In explaining the fluctuation over the business cycle in total man-hours worked per unit time,
variation in the number of hours per worker per week is of roughly equal importance with variation
in the number of workers employed.24 To allow our model to represent this fact accurately, we
need to allow a decision about hours per worker per week. To keep things simple, we will (a) look
24SeePrescott (1986).
11at only the dynamic equilibrium in which employment follows acontinuous path, (b) assume that
the number of hours per worker per week is chosen unilaterally by the firm (althoughthe workers
decide whether to put forth any effort during those hours), and (c) restrict the way in which a
worker's utility and the chance of detection as a shirker in the model can depend on weekly hours
per worker, as follows.
It seems reasonable to suppose that the disutility of effort is proportional to the number of hours
over which that effort must be exerted, but that there is also a disutilityof having to be present at
the workplace for a given length of time that is separate from the disutility of effort. Therefore, let us
assume that a worker's instantaneous utility when working is equal to h(t)(w(t) —e) —(h(t)),where
h is the number of hours per week, w is now the hourly wage, and 0(h) is the disutility from having
to be physically present at work h hours per week. The marginal disutility of hours atwork should
be positive and increasing in h, so we will assume further that '(h) >0and p"(h) >0.It also
seems reasonable to assume that the probability of detection as a shirker should be proportional to
the number of hours spent at work. But then the probability of an error falsely labelling someone as
a shirker should also be proportional to the number of hours at work. Therefore, let us assumethat
the instantaneous probability of separation for a nonshirker is 6 + ch(t), where b is the probability
of separation for exogenous reasons as before and ch(t) is the probability of being falsely labelled as
a shirker or "false positive rate." For a shirker, let us assume that the instantaneous probability of
separation is 6 + ch(t) + qh(t) where qh(t) is the weekly "detection rate" or additional probability
of being labelled a shirker due to actually being a shirker.
Given these specifications of the instantaneous utility function and the instantaneous proba-
bilities of separation for shirkers and nonshirkers, we can modify (1') to
(23) rV(t) =h(t)w(t)
—(h(t))-—(6+ ch(t) + qh(fl) (V,(t) —V(t))+
and we can modify (2') to
(24) rV"(t) =h(t)(w(t)
—e)+ (b + ch(t))(V,(t) —V'(t))+ Vi'.
Because of these specifications, (3)—(3) will continue to hold as written, (5) now arising from
subtracting (24) from (23) and dividing by h.
12In place of (9) we now have25




But h(t) is a choice variable for the firm. Since an atomistic firm can hire workers to get as mud
labor as it wants at the hourly wage w(t)determinedby (25), the firm's objective in choosin1
weekly hours per worker, h(t), is simply to minimize the current cost of labor, w().Thefirst-orde
condition for minimizing the right-hand side of (25) with respect to h can be written
(26) h(t)'(h(t)) -(h(i))=th+ [r+b + a(t)j.
Becauseof the convexity of (h), the quantity h'(h) —d.(h)is a monotonically increasing functio
of h, which in turn implies that the optimal value of h(t) is a monotonically increasing function c
the fixed cost of a worker, ti3[r+b + a(t)], which is an exogenous variable from a single firm
point of view.
Substituting from (26) into (25), we discover further that
(27) w(t)= (h(t))+ e+
In words, (27) states that on the margin, the hourly wage must exactly compensate for the margin
disutility of working an extra hour, comprised of the marginal disutility of being physically preser
on the job an extra hour, the disutility of exerting effort for another hour, and the expected utilit
loss due to the danger of being falsely labelled a shirker as a result of working an extra hou
Equation (27) implies that, holding the level of effort fixed, workers would choose the same week]
hours as the firm chooses for them. Thus, the firm's authority to choose weekly hours will not be
serious bone of contention with the workers. However, since the level of effort is notfixed,it is sti
important for the firm to choose weekly hours, since workers allowed to choose weekly hours as
their own effort jointly might well choose the combination of relatively low hours and low effort.
We can invert (27) to obtain
(28) h(t) =H(w(t))=(wt-- cs).
Note that while w(1) is now an hourly quantity, the unempIyment benefit i(t) is still a weekly quantity th
does notdepend on h(t).
13Recognizing that now
a(t)





we cansubstitutefrom (28) and (29) into (25) to obtain a counterpart to (12):





whichdefines w(t)implicitly.26Similarly, (14) can be modified to
(31) w(t)=F' (H (w(t)) L(t))
Graphically, the fact that weekly hours tend to increase with the wageflattens the curve
showing the "Marginal Revenue Product Condition" and changes the slopeof the curve showing
the steady-state "No Shirking Condition," but otherwise leaves the pictures essentiallythe same.
Changes in weekly hours can be seen directly in the graphs, since h(t) is a monotonicallyincreasing
function of w(t).
Analytically, we can linearize around a steady state and solve the resulting differential equations
as follows. Using asterisks to denote steady-state values and tildes to denote divergencesfrom steady
state values, the linearized version of (30) is
(32)
= + + [b + eh]Nt]h+(N-L)qw
th(t),
where a = = is the elasticity of weekly hours with respect to the wage.27
Linearizing (31) yields
(33) t(t) = pF'(Lh) +(Lt+ LH'(wD(t))]
= •- ,-
p() L u,
We could use (26)and (27) toexpressw(t) directlyas a function of exogenous variables, but the approach used
here leads to expressions more easily interpretable in terms of standard empirical quantities
27Theenvelope theorem is helpful in obtaining (32). Since h(t) is chosen to ETIJnimze w(t), endogenous changes in
h(t)canbe ignored when deriving a linear approximation like (32), except insofar as those endogenous changes
in h(s) affect a(s), which is exogenous to an individual firm. Also, note that L(t) is zero in the steady state,
but that L(t) need not be zero.
14where .,=—L;F7L)shows the degree of diminishing returns to labor. Isolating th(t).in (32), we
find that
(34)th(t) =
(N-L)qw{2 + ÷[b+chtI?TLN(O] e




Equating the right-hand sides of (34) and (35) yields a first-order differential equation that
can be read off from those equations. To solve for a particular solution of this equation, we need a
boundary condition. If we label the time when a disturbance to the steady state first becomes known
as time zero, and follow the standard practice of taking steady-state values as initial conditions, then
the equilibrium in which employment follows a continuous path is distinguished by the boundary














Thus, to a first-order approtcimation, 1(t)isan exponentially distributed lag of the exogenous
disturbances fl(t), N(t) and ,withlag length 'Ct. Equation (36) can be substituted into (35) to
find a lengthy expression for zD(t) as well. Multiplying the expression for ti'(t) by H'(w') yields the
linear approximation for h(t). The path of output corresponding to the paths of employment and
28f(N•—L•)qw> 1,then the equilibrium is unstable, since an increase in weekly hours increases turnover
through increasing the frequency of workers being falsely labelled as shirkers, causing wages, and therefore
hours, to rise still further, in a way that does not converge. To put it another way, as each firm ma to avoid
the higher fixed costs per worker by extending weekly hours, the increased turnover has a negative spillover
effect on the motivation of workers at other firms, which raises the fixed cost per worker still further. There
should be a stable equilibrium at a point with long enough working hours, since when the marginal disutility of
hours on the job, Ø'(h'), is high enough, it will tend to make (N.c.i.S7qw.=*'fh)++cefe N-—L•lessthan
one.
29Withoutthe ssumption that employment follows a continuous path, there would be many sunspot equilibna
approximated by other particular solutions to the differential equation.
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Or, if the movement in p represents a productivity shock rather than merely arelative price change,
1 would have to be added to this expression for 1.
The quantities we are especially interested in are the convergence rategiven by (37), with
the lag length as its reciprocal, and the macroeconomic labor supply elasticities. Since employment
adjusts slowly, the short-run macroeconomic labor supply elasticity is simply the elasticityof weekly
hours per worker with respect to the wage, or .Observationally,this would be the microeconomic
labor supply elasticity found when looking only at the variation in hours of employed workers.
and not at movements into and out of employment. Estimates for this number center around
approximately .2.30Thelong-run macroeconomic labor supply elasticity is the sum of this elasticit
of weekly hours with respect to the wage and the elasticity of employment along the steady-state
"No Shirking Condition." This long-run wage elasticity of employment along the steady-state No
Shirking Condition," which will be denoted ,3, can be calculated from (36) and (37) as the effect
of. a permanent shift in a horizontal labor demand curve from one wage to another.3' If we make
the labor demand curve flat by setting F"(.) to zero, then=and = — = 0.
Substituting in N(s) = 0, (s)= 0and p(s) =p,we then find that
(39) =limL(t)=N—L —L)—ochL
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From (37) it can be seen that the convergence rate ic increases with the exogenous quit rate b,
the weekly wage wh and the hourly detection rate q, and falls with the disutility of effort ë, the
elasticity of hours s, and the false positive rate ch. If ch is relatively small, the convergence rate
3° See the estimaLes for the intertempora.l elasticity of substitution in labor supply in Pencavel (1986), which seem
appropriate for studying movements in labor supply over the basinesa cycle.
' Though the labor demand curve is downward sloping rather than horizontal, in the tradition of demand and
supply analyse, the effect of this non-injinite demand elasticity should be kept separate from the supply
elasticity.
16increases with ',thedegree of diminishing returns to la.bor—or in other words, the convergence
rate tends to be greater when labor demand is inelastic. Finally, the convergence rate c is greatest
when the fraction of workers employed -isnear 0 or 1, and has a minimum at an intermediate
value of 4-.
Equation(40) indicates that the long-run elasticity of employment increases with the hourly
detection rate q and the weekly wage wh, and declines with the disutility of effort ë, the false
positive rate ch and the elasticity of weekly hours a. If ch is relatively small, the long-run
elasticity of employment decreases with the exogenous quit rate b and is highest when the fraction
of workers employed is at an intermediate value.
We can roughly calibrate the convergence rate and the long-run elasticity of employment 3.
The steady-state unemployment rate should be32 about .08, so we can set 4;-at92. For the
labor market as a whole, Medoff (1979) finds that separations, excluding layoffs,33 occur at a rate
of about 32% per year. Guessing that of that 32% per year, 2% is due to false positives that lead tc
unjust firings and 30% is due to exogenous separations, we can set ch =.02/yearand b =.3/year
Assuming an underlying Cobb-Douglas production function,should be equal to capital's share
in output, which is about .333. We can take .2 as our estimate of a. The last quantity we need tc
know is the ratio q'whichis the dollar value of the surplus from getting a job divided by the
rate of pay. The dollar value of the surplus from getting a job can be gauged either by thinking oi
how much someone would pay to get a job, or by thinking of how much on-the-job leisure could
be taken, how many things could be stolen and how much money could be embezzled, on average
before getting fired. For an average job, this surplus might be equal to about two month's worth
of pay, so that =J66year. Using these values of the parameters, we find that the three
terms comprising c add up to c(4 + .15 —.001)/year=4.149/year,which means it would take
about two months to get half-way to the new steady state after a permanent shock. The two terms
comprising the long-run elasticity of employment come to .13 —.001=.129,which would be a
32Theappropriate numbermightbe much larger, if the potential Labor farce includes many people not actively
looking for work and therefore not counted a.s "in the labor force" in the official statistics. If this number i
madelarger,theresults become more like those in the next section.
3,3Sincewe have assumed away layoffs in deriving all of our results so fax, it is not appropriate to include the layof
rate. If the only reason layoffs occurred was because of firms that go out of busins according to a Poisson
process and lay off all of their workers at once, then the layoff rate could simply be added to I' in all of th
equations. (Medoff (1979) finds an average layoff rate of &bout 1.7% per month or about 20% per year.)
17modest, but important addition to the long-run elasticity of labor supply.
One otherquantityof some interest is the elasticity of output with respect to changes in p.
which involves the elasticity of labor demand as well as the elasticity of labor supply. Equations





and the long-run elasticity of output with respect to changes in p is
43
—whL +htvq(N —L)—ach
( — p(l+ )L c(1+ c7)ëLc(t + o)
if changes in p represent relative price movements, with ito be added to each of these two quantities
if changes in p represent productivity movements. Since the quantity isjust labor's share
in output, which we have already set at .667, we can use the parameters above to estimate these
Long-run output elasticities as .125 and .199 respectively, plus 1 if productivity movements rather
than relative price movements are at issue.
V. The Dual Labor Market
As in Bulow and Summers (1986), the model we have been using can be reinterpreted as a
model of the dual labor market, with a high-productivity primary sector bedeviled by problems of
effort elicitation and a low-productivity secondary sector free of such problems.°4 Since there is no
problem of effort elicitation in the secondary sector, we can assume that it is perfectly competitive,
and, that in the secondary sector, the number of hours per week is chosen by the workers.
When the word "unemployment" used above is reinterpreted as underemployment (i.e., being
employed in the secondary sector when fully qualified to work in the primary sector), the only way in
which the results change is that i1—wh.ich now represents the flow of utility when in the secondary
sector—becomes endogenous. Using the subscript "2" to indicate quantities in the secondary sector,
(44)
(t) = h2() = -2hw (t) + &2(t)) = L(t)h(t) =(1 + 'y)(N -
We cannot have both a dual labor market and unemployment without expanding the model further, es is done
further on in Bulow and Summers (1986). This will be left to the interested reader.
18The first equality holds because of the envelope theorem, the second because of the labor demand
function in the secondary sector, the third by substituting in for L2(t) and )i2(t), and the last
equality arises by using the equivalence between the second and fourth expressions to eliminate
w2(). Substituting the expression for (t) given by (44) into (32)—(35), we obtain a variant of (36)
without the term involving '(t)andwith given by
(45)
—[b+ eh]N+
7wh*q(N —L)cr'ch+ —N—L (i+cr)')ëL 1+a'y(1+o2y2)ë
Thus,the convergence rate c tends to be increased by the fact that drawing workers out of un-
deremployment will raise the wage in the secondary sector. The influence of the secondary sector
on the convergence rate in the primary sector increases with the degree of diminishing returns to
labor in the secondary sector ,theweekly wage in the secondary sector wh. and the hourly
detection rate q, and decreases with the elasticity of weekly hours in the secondary sector 02and
the disutility of effort è.




"" — (b+chN ________ N—L
The expressions for the short- and longrun elasticities of output with respect to changes in p are
the same as above ((42) and (43)), with the convergence rate appearing in those expressions being
given by (45) instead of by (37). The long-run elasticity of employment 0tendsto be reduced by
the fact that drawing workers out of under-employment will raise the wage in the secondary sector,
the more so the more ,c is influenced by this fact.
The most important change in moving to the dual labor market interpretation of the model is
in theparametervalues that seem appropriate. .isnow the fraction of workers employed in the
primary sector, which we can put at .5. Since jobs in the primary sector tend to be more stable
than those in the secondary sector, let us reduce the exogenous separation rate b to .2/year. Let us
also raise our estimate of the dollar value of the surplus from the job to four months worth of pay,
so that =.333 year.To represent the fact that the primary sector is more capital intensive
than the secondary sector, let us raiseto .4 and set y2 at .2. Finally, let us assume that the weekly
wage in the secondary sector is half that in the primary sector, or -= .5,and that the elasticity
of hours with respect to the wage is the same in both sectors, or 02= = .2.The false positive
19rate ch can be left the same as before (.02). Then ,c(.44+1.112— .001+289)/year =1.84/year.
which means it would take about four-and-a-half months to get half-way to the new steady state
after a permanent shock. The long-run elasticity of employment in the primary sector for these
parameter values is 34.114. Because of this high long-run elasticity of employment, while the
short-run elasticity of output with respect top is only .111, the long-run elasticity of primary sector
output with respect to p is .95—with I added to both if it is a productivity shock rather than a
relative price change.
The key parameter change in raising the estimates of the lag length and the long-run elas-
ticity of employment above those in the previous section is the reduction in 4-.Havinga large
"reserve army" of the underemployed allows for long lags and large movements in primary sector
employment.
Of course, since a positive shock to p causes workers to be drawn out of the secondary sector.











For the parameter values we have been considering, this long-run elasticity of output in the sec-
ondary sector with respect top is about 1.254 (regardless of whether changes in p represent relative
price shocks or productivity shocksin the primary sector). Since the shares for labor we have
chosen for each sector together with the wage bill in the secondary sector being half that in the
primary sector implies that 4= 375,we can calculate the short-run elasticity of GNP
with respect to changes in p as .08 1, since no workers move between sectors in the short
run; the long-run elasticity of GNP with respect to changes in p is .95_.3?5.I.254.349with
20.727 addedto both elasticitiesif changes in p represent productivity shocks instead of just
relative price changes. Thus, even whenthereductioninsecondary sector output is accounted for,
increases in p resultinsignificant increases in GNP under the dual labor market interpretation of
themodel.
VI.Conclusion
Shapiro and Stiglitz' (1984) effort elicitation mode! has been shown to have many intrigu-
ing implications for labor market dynamics. To begin with, it has a surprising array of sunspot
equilibria driven by extraneous variables. When the dynamic equilibrium with a continuous path
of employment is selected out of this array of equilibria on the grounds of realism, the solution
continues to exhibit many interesting features. A slow adjustment of employment to labor market
shocks is supported by a negative motivational externality of hiring that makes firms reluctant to
do substantial hiring at the same time other firms are. The fact that employment does adjust.
given time, results in a macroeconomic labor supply elasticity higher than the microeconomic labor
supply elasticity of a representative worker.
Adding to this canonical model a decision about weekly hours per worker and interpreting
it as a model of the dual-labor market and involuntary underemployment rather than as a model
of involuntary unemployment allows us to reproduce many of the major qualitative features of
business cycle movements. A reasonable estimate of the convergence rate endogenous to the model
under this interpretation indicates lags that are substantial in length when compared to the length
of a business cycle (with a half-life of roughly four-and-a-half months) and macroeconomic labor
supply elasticities that are quite large (on the order of 4 for the primary sector alone) once these
lags play themselves out. Further, under this dual labor market interpretation, the model makes
the empirically valid prediction of procyclical upgrading of jobs on a large scale (increases in GNP
being associated with workers moving out of the low-paying secondary sector, into the higher-paying
primary sector).
Two further aspects of the predicted dynamics of the effort elicitation model may help to
provide an empirical test of the model. First, the model predicts that the aggregate rate of hiring
should be a key variable in affecting the labor costs,35 and therefore the hiring decisions of individual
"tnpractice, it may be important to distinguish labor costs from the wage, since the assumption we have made
21firms. Second, the predicted lag length for aggregate labor-market adjustment after shocks and the
long-run macroeconomic labor supply elasticity depend in a precise way on the parameters ofthe
model. Since there are many different "labor markets" in the world, separated from each other either
by national boundaries or by observable worker characteristics, not only the general magnitude
of the adjustment speed and the long-run elasticity of employment predicted by the model, but
also the predicted variation in these two quantities across labor markets can be compared to
empirically observed adjustment speeds and long-run employment elasticities. As just one example.
for reasonable parameter values the model makes the empirically valid prediction that observable
subgroups of the population forming labor markets with especially high average unemployment
rates will also exhibit especially large variations in unemployment over the business cycle. Another
prediction, waiting to be tested, is that, other things being equal, a higher separation rate should
be associated with quicker adjustment and smaller long-run elasticiti of employment. Many other
predictions of that sort can be extracted from the equations above.
One message of the preceding analysis has been only implicit. It is that despite the different
assumptions that distinguish efficiency wage models from Real Business Cycle models, both types
of models address many of the same questions, and are amenable to many of the same modes of
analysis. In the absence of any costs of changing prices, dynamic efficiency wage models are indeed
real models of the business cycle that are especially concerned with accounting for involuntary un-
employment and underemployment and predicting the consequences of involuntary unemployment
and underemployment for the workings of the labor market.
thata JIrmcannot delaywagepaymentsimplicitlyowed to its workers may not always be true. When firms can
delaywagepayments impljdtly owed to workers, unobserble labor costs replace wages in all of the equations.
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